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*716 INTRODUCTION
The cause of global health today is arguably the most influential human rights movement ever seen, mobilizing vast
flows of direct and indirect aid to the developing world to fight disease and build health care infrastructure; prompting
the establishment of international organizations like UNAIDS and the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria (Global Fund); including global health as a priority in major diplomatic summits; and driving the formation
and implementation of international agreements to address global health threats. Champions of this movement claim
that the diverse and influential state and non-state actors participating in the development of the global health regime
are evidence of its normative, law-making power. Speaking of a range of initiatives undertaken by the World Health
Organization (“WHO”), Christopher McDougall, Ross Upshur and Kumanan Wilson wrote that:
Each . . . reflects a revolutionary willingness of the international community to accept new forms of
supranational authority and to abide by the principle that national sovereignty can in some circumstances
be subordinate to public health protection. As such, *717 they are integral parts of the evolution of
international health governance towards a global public health security regime. 1

In 2007, the governments of Brazil, France, Indonesia, Norway, Senegal, South Africa, and Thailand issued the Oslo
Ministerial Declaration declaring that:
The early 21st century . . . has seen an unprecedented convergence of global health and foreign policy . . .
[e]nsuring public health on a global scale is of bene?t to all countries. Powerful synergies arise when national
interest coincides with the need for concerted regional and global action. 2

Indeed, the evidence for the normative strength of the global health movement is persuasive. From 1995 to 2010, the value
of goods and services aimed at improving global health increased at least threefold. 3 Global health was introduced as a
priority at the 26th G8 Summit--giving rise to the Global Fund--and has remained on the agenda ever since. 4 Since 2005,
states have updated the International Health Regulations (“IHR”) to coordinate broader responses to more diseases and
have concluded the first international public health treaty, the Framework Convention for Tobacco Control (“FCTC”).
Yet that evidence is also deceiving. The 2005 IHR, concluded in the wake of outbreaks of diseases largely in developing
countries, appeared to falter on the unwillingness of wealthy countries to equitably address vaccine production and
distribution. Key provisions of the FCTC have failed in the face of challenges tobacco firms have mounted on the
basis of their rights in trademarks and brands. Indeed, formal global health instruments that purportedly capture the
health movement's normative force have been systematically undermined by a competing global movement: international
intellectual property protection.
Intellectual property rights and public health interventions are in many ways natural antagonists. The exclusive control
given pharmaceutical *718 patent holders, while theoretically required to encourage investments in research and
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development, stands at odds with access to affordable medicines. The goodwill trademark proprietors build through
investments in advertising and marketing often trades off with costs imposed upon society through excessive or
deceptively-induced consumption. 5 This antagonism has long played out in the domestic context, where lawmakers
conditioned intellectual property rights on their relationship with other national health priorities. India, for example,
prohibited pharmaceutical patents for most of its history, a decision driven by the need to facilitate access to affordable
medicine for its massive population. 6
While national politics played the major role in deciding the balance between intellectual property protection and public
health priorities, international agreements governing intellectual property and international public health issues tended
to acknowledge the threat strong IP protections *719 posed for public health measures. The Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, for example, allowed states to invalidate or refuse to register trademarks that misled or
deceived consumers and left states free to grant compulsory licenses for reasons of public health. In any case, international
IP and international public health instruments have depended on traditional diplomatic compliance mechanisms like
good faith fulfillment of obligations, consultations in the event of a dispute and tit-for-tat sanctions. 7 In short, they
were enforced, often weakly, at the state-to-state level. 8
In the last 30 years, the global movement to elevate the international legal status of intellectual property rights has also
achieved substantial gains. Industrialized states successfully tied intellectual property protections they desired to the
reductions in tariffs and other barriers to imports of foreign agricultural, clothing and textile goods sought by many
developing countries, formalized in the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”).
Thousands of bilateral investment treaties, largely forged between developed states and developing states, included strong
protections for intellectual property rights that frequently exceeded those in existing international agreements, even
TRIPS, and certainly beyond those typically found in national legislative frameworks. 9
Yet, unlike the earlier era when IP rights and international public health law were roughly equivalent in their limited
influence, the expansion of international public health law has proceeded with its explicit and implicit subordination
to IP rights. For example, TRIPS provides a general authorization for parties to “adopt measures necessary to protect
public *720 health” but requires that “such measures are consistent with the provisions” of TRIPS. 10
The confrontation between the growing strength of international intellectual property law and national public health
measures is well-documented. Even before TRIPS, IP rights holders successfully used international agreements to thwart
domestic public health policies. Contesting Australia's 1992 effort to require tobacco manufacturers to sell cigarettes in
plain packaging, British American Tobacco argued before the Australian Senate that such a law would violate both the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Australian Constitution. 11 Persuaded by the tobacco
industry, the Australian government rejected the proposed regulations. 12 In 1994, Philip Morris and RJR Reynolds
undertook a similarly successful campaign in Canada based in significant part on the intellectual property protection
provisions of NAFTA. In 1998, pharmaceutical firms holding the patents to antiretroviral drugs in South Africa brought
suit against the government for its efforts to use parallel imports and price controls to expand access to treatment for its
exploding HIV/AIDS population. 13 Their suit was based in significant part on the failure of the government's legislative
basis for the measures to comply with TRIPS. The firms ultimately relented, although with guarantees by South Africa
to respect TRIPS obligations. 14
The purpose of this Article is to argue that international intellectual property law has not only erected substantial
barriers to domestic or national measures taken in the interest of public health, but that intellectual property protections
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embedded in a wide range of investment, trade and IP treaties have substantially undermined existing and proposed
international public health law. From vaccine development orchestrated by WHO (acting under the authority of the IHR)
to the marketing of breast-milk substitutes to pregnant and nursing mothers in developing countries to efforts by national
authorities to implement provisions of the FCTC, international *721 intellectual property law has systematically
curtailed the intended population health benefits promised by effective implementation of these agreements.
Indeed, to the extent international public health agreements have influenced the conduct of states party to such
agreements, I argue that they have done so not because of the normative force the global health movement has exercised
on foreign policy, but precisely because of politics as usual. The efforts of states like Brazil, India, Indonesia, South
Africa, and Thailand in securing affordable access to medicines and vaccines, enforcing international marketing codes,
and fending off IP-based challenges to new public health interventions represents one manifestation of a world in which
the centers of hard and soft diplomatic power are diffusing from Europe and North America to Africa, Asia and South
America. 15 In areas from arms control to climate change, this phenomenon is generally known as “multipolarity,”
distinguishing the bipolar Cold War rivalry between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and harkening back to nineteenth century
European politics dominated by Great Powers and characterized by an ultimately unstable balance of power between
them. 16
On the one hand, this trend should encourage international public health law advocates because it increases the likelihood
that international public health agreements will achieve at least partial population health gains through unilateral or
coordinated action by middle income states. On the other hand, the fact that international public health law is so frail
in its confrontation with international IP agreements reveals the weak role norm creation is playing in the context of
international public health law. The Article argues that as international public health advocates press for agreements
covering a wider range of issues like alcohol control, medical research and innovation, and even a comprehensive
convention on global health, they must confront obstacles posed by international intellectual property law more squarely
than they now do, as well as shape their agenda in light of the shifting alignment of global economic and political power.
Part I of this Article traces the history of international public health law as it evolved from a loose network of politicized
(and subsequently ineffective) international treaties in the late nineteenth century to a comprehensive movement toward a
regime of conventions and protocols addressing the prevention and management of health threats that cross international
borders.
*722 Part II traces the parallel history of international intellectual property protections beginning with the 1883 Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property and growing to include a wide network of bilateral, regional and
multilateral investment and trade treaties.
Part III identifies episodes beginning in 1994 and concluding in 2012, when these movements collided over a range of
international public health law instruments: the 1981 WHO Guidelines on the Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes, the
2005 International Health Regulations, and the 2005 Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. These episodes, in
turn, foreshadow likely conflicts should proposals for a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control or an even widerreaching Framework Convention on Global Health materialize. These episodes illustrate the weak role of international
public health law in shaping states' behavior.
Part IV recommends solutions to the current problems, including the strengthening of public health exceptions in bilateral
investment treaties, the withdrawal of certain dispute resolution procedures across a wide range of treaties, the explicit
management of intellectual property rights in future international public health agreements, and the crafting of a global
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public health agenda that focuses on political practicalities as shifts in global power change the strength and influence
of developing states.
I. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
The end of the 20th century ushered in the era of global public health. In this “global health revolution” 17 , states
have not only revised and expanded the IHR and established the FCTC, but they have also re-oriented developing
states' public health policy trajectories through their aid programs (like the U.S. President's Emergency Relief for
Aids in Africa (PEPFAR)) and the development of health diplomacy. Major non-governmental organizations like the
William J. Clinton Foundation (now the Bill, Hillary and Chelsea Clinton Foundation), the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation, and the Bloomberg Family Foundation have also allocated significant and influential parts of their giving
to the alleviation of global public health threats ranging from malaria to tobacco use. Other major international legal
efforts lie in wait, like the American Public Health Association's call for a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control
and even more ambitious proposals like a Framework Convention on Global Health. 18
*723 Theoretically, this revolution represents the growing acknowledgment that economic development depends on a
population that enjoys access to a basic level of health care and attention to conditions that accommodate individual
and public health, the “right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health” under international
human rights law. 19 Practically speaking, the growth of international public health law is a response to a globalized
world of health threats including disease outbreaks that cross international borders, food security and safety under
liberalized investment and trade rules and the worldwide marketing of products like tobacco, alcohol and processed
food that pose unique challenges for the management of cancer, diabetes, heart disease, hypertension and strokes. 20
The economic and human cost of these burdens is vast and growing. 21 The emergence of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s as
well as increasingly threatening strains of influenza brought into vivid focus the inadequacy of existing international
coordination mechanisms to handle infectious diseases, including the manufacturing and distribution of medicines and
vaccines. 22 Not only did the 1969 International Health Regulations only cover cholera, plague and yellow fever, but they
also lacked meaningful requirements for states to “detect, report, and respond to public health events of international
concern.” 23 For example, tobacco consumption, *724 the principal preventable threat to individual and public health
in both developed and developing countries, annually kills approximately five million people worldwide and is expected
to kill one billion people in this century, if current trends persist. 24 Liberalized trade and investment rules have shifted
the massive disease burden from tobacco consumption from developed to developing countries. 25 Indeed, this shift
explains in part the origin of the FCTC. 26
Similarly, the World Health Organization points to processed foods heavily marketed toward children, expanding
consumption of fast foods and sugary beverages, as important factors in the emerging global obesity epidemic. 27 Obesity
levels are rising throughout both developed and developing countries, playing some causative role in heart disease,
diabetes, certain cancers, osteoarthritis and strokes. 28 The scope and strength of international instruments targeting
these threats has correspondingly expanded. 29
*725 This expansion, what I refer to as the internationalization of public health law, conceivably includes agreements
and political commitments made across several issue-areas. 30 For example, the 1949 Geneva Conventions codified
customary rules requiring access of medical personnel to the injured and sick during armed conflicts and guaranteed
prisoners of war access to some level of health care. Similarly, arms control treaties like the NPT, the Biological
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Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention are theoretically driven by those weapons' potentially
devastating effect on human health and life. 31 The 1978 Alma Ata Declaration and the 1993 Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action marked important turning points in the history of the right to health without formalizing any
express commitments by governments. 32 Indeed, judges, scholars, human rights activists and law-makers have never
agreed upon the content of the right to the highest attainable standard of health since its codification in international
human rights treaties. 33 For purposes of this Article, I limit the internationalization of public health law to international
legal regimes designed to address health threats, specifically those undertaken by the World Health Organization and
its predecessor, the International Sanitary Conventions.
*726 A. The International San itary Conventions
The internationalization of public health law began with an effort to coordinate national efforts to contain disease. In the
middle of the nineteenth century, states maintained their own standards for inspection and quarantine of foreign goods
and peoples that posed public health threats, especially cholera. 34 Between 1851 and 1892, predominantly European
powers met in an effort to conclude a list of internationally actionable diseases and the appropriate methods by which
their spread might be limited. The health positions taken by participating governments and medical delegates were
inevitably politicized, as the etiology of each disease (and therefore its containment) necessitated measures that affected
the commercial interests of each state. 35 Britain, for example, persistently opposed measures that imposed significant
burdens on maritime trade. 36
Nevertheless, in 1892 the first International Sanitary Convention (“ISC”) was concluded, which aimed to monitor
westbound shipping through the Suez Canal. 37 Between 1893 and 1903, four more international conventions were
convened, steadily expanding the diseases deemed appropriate for cooperation and control, the international adoption
of national policies for surveillance; quarantine of certain items and persons; processes for sterilizing goods suspected of
facilitating infection, and the notification requirements for other participants. At the 1903 convention, delegates agreed
both on the need to codify in a single instrument the preceding agreements as well as to establish an international health
organization.
These objectives of the 1903 ISC continued through the conventions held in 1912, 1926 and 1938. During this time,
two international health organizations were established and the 1903 ISC was updated to reflect advances in the
control of infectious diseases. At that time, “numerous international legal regimes addressing public health issues arose,
particularly treaties dealing with . . . opium and alcohol, occupational hazards, and transboundary pollution.” 38 As
historians of the ISC conferences observed, over time the agenda of the international meetings moved from coordinating
European responses to disease threats originating from Asia to serving as an important forum for clinical researchers,
bacteriologists, physicians and other medical researchers to influence international law and international relations as
they affected the spread of disease.
*727 The treaties' stated objectives tended to go unfulfilled. For example, it took seven international conventions
meeting between 1851 and 1892 to finally generate the International Sanitary Convention of 1892, which was limited to
cholera. 39 The eleventh International Sanitary Convention succeeded in creating an international health organization,
the Office International d'Hygiène Publique, but it “had no authority to do field work within a particular country, even
at that country's request.” 40 In its 2005 revision of the International Health Regulations, the WHO's Intergovernmental
Working Group noted that the IHR had been developed “to replace the largely ineffective international sanitary
conventions, which were hampered inter alia by a lack of consistency and uniformity in their implementation.” 41 The
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purposes of the conventions became less legal in a strict sense and more technocratic, changes which were to foreshadow
the behavior of the World Health Organization upon its establishment in 1948. 42
B. The World Health Organization
When international lawmakers established the World Health Organization, they intended to give it strong lawmaking and regulatory authority. 43 Article 19 of the WHO Constitution authorized it to conclude treaties within its
broadly worded mandate, while Article 21 gave the World Health Assembly the authority to adopt legally binding
recommendations in five discrete areas: sanitary and quarantine regulations; nomenclatures on diseases, causes of death,
and public health practices; standards for diagnostic procedures for international use; standards for safety, purity, and
potency of biological, pharmaceutical, and similar products moving in international commerce; and advertising and
labeling of biological, pharmaceutical, and similar products moving in international commerce. 44 In addition, Article
22 established the binding legal effect of these regulations *728 unless states opted out of them within the notification
period, an innovation that collapsed the usual drawn-out ratification process historically experienced in the international
law-making process. 45
Instead of exercising its formal legal authority, WHO embarked upon several decades of technocratic observation,
advising and support. 46 The World Health Assembly updated the International Sanitary Regulations in 1969, but the
scope and strength of the IHR were minimal. 47 WHO focused on epidemiological and technocratic expertise, giving
itself a central coordinating role between other international and non-governmental organizations and making far
more frequent use of its Article 23 recommendation-issuing authority. 48 The World Health Assembly regularly issued
resolutions advising governments to undertake a range of measures related to its highly regarded epidemiological work,
but steered almost completely clear of its law-making and regulation-issuing authority. 49 These resolutions covered a
wide range of areas, from the marketing of breast-milk substitutes (and maternal and child health more generally) to the
detection and prevention of infectious diseases to tobacco control.
1. International Code on the Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
After the 1969 IHR, WHO aimed at using its Article 21 powers to address child malnutrition in the International Code
on the Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes, although the policy eventually took form as an Article 23 recommendation.
In 1974, the World Health Assembly acknowledged *729 the declining rate of mothers exclusively breastfeeding for
the first six months of life, the period WHO recommends for both maternal and child health. 50 The recommendation
is not driven by nutritional variations between breastmilk and infant formula, but by the risks inherent in mixing
(especially with contaminated water) and administering formula as well as the malnutrition that accompanies improper
or imbalanced substitutes. As Ted Kennedy phrased it:
Can a product which requires clean water, good sanitation, adequate family income and a literate parent to
follow printed instructions be properly and safely used in areas where water is contaminated, sewage runs
in the street, poverty is severe and illiteracy high? 51

The evidence is persuasive: 13% of the 10.9 million deaths of children younger than 5 years could be prevented every year
if universal protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding were achieved. 52 In addition, breastfeeding plays a role
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in spacing pregnancies where contraception is unavailable or contraception failures are common. The declining rates
of breastfeeding were attributed to food firms' aggressive marketing of infant formula, other milk products, cereals for
infants, vegetable mixes, and baby teas and juices, all of which fall under WHO's definition of breastmilk substitutes. 53
These firms' marketing practices either asserted or implied nutritional and other health equivalencies with, or superiority
to, exclusive breastfeeding.
Between 1977 and 1979, children's malnutrition became a priority for the World Health Assembly and WHO began
working with UNICEF on a framework for “regulating inappropriate sales promotion of infant foods that can be used
to replace breast milk.” 54 Those discussions revolved around five themes: the encouragement and support of breastfeeding; the promotion and support of appropriate and timely complementary feeding (weaning) practices with the use
of local food resources; the strengthening of education, training and information on infant and young child feeding; the
promotion of the health and social status of women in relation to infant and young child health and feeding; and the
appropriate marketing and distribution of breast-milk substitutes. In 1980, the World Health Assembly endorsed the
WHO/UNICEF findings and recommended that “there should be an international code of marketing of infant formula
and *730 other products used as breast-milk substitutes.” In early 1981, WHO endorsed a draft of the Code and
recommended it to the World Health Assembly, which adopted it by an overwhelmingly vote. 55
The International Code seeks to prevent companies from advertising; implement strict labeling requirements, including
a proscription on infant images or other pictures which idealize breastmilk substitutes; limit influence on health care
workers; and, prohibit distribution of free samples of breast milk substitutes. 56 The International Code, together
with subsequent recommendations, is not a binding treaty, but represents an evidence-based minimum standard that
informs human rights obligations. 57 Eighty-four states have enacted legislation implementing all or some aspects of
the International Code while another fourteen have legislation pending. 58 Since the International Code's adoption,
food firms have systematically exploited its ambiguities and have directly challenged labeling provisions that diminish
intellectual property rights in trademarks and tradenames. 59
2. International Health Regulations
The 1980s and early 1990s witnessed the emergence of new infectious diseases like HIV as well as the resurgence of older
diseases like cholera. In 1995, the World Health Assembly instructed WHO's Director General to revisit the IHR precisely
because the regulations neglected “the emergence of new infectious agents” and failed to provide for an adequate response
to those that were covered. 60 The World Health Assembly attributed these failures to the erosion of barriers between
goods and people. 61 The protracted IHR revision process overlapped with acrimonious *731 negotiations between
developing and developed states over the inclusion of intellectual property protections in the global free trade regime. 62
In 2003, the outbreak of SARS--and the hesitation of the Chinese government to report or contain it-- facilitated the
2005 revisions. 63
The IHR (2005) was revised to encompass the detection and prevention of all infectious diseases. 64 Their scope
was expanded “to include any event that would constitute a public health emergency of international concern.” 65
“The Regulations now encompass public health risks whatever their origin or source (Article 1.1), including: (1)
naturally occurring infectious diseases, whether of known or unknown etiological origin; (2) the potential international
spread of non-communicable diseases caused by chemical or radiological agents in products moving in international
commerce; and (3) suspected intentional or accidental releases of biological, chemical, or radiological substances.” 66
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Acknowledging the importance of communication and cooperation to successful detection and prevention of
communicable diseases, States Parties are obligated to “develop the means to detect, report, and respond to public health
emergencies . . . and establish a National IHR Focal Point [NFP] 67 for communication to and from WHO.” 68 State
Parties must inform WHO within 24 hours of an assessment of any event that could be considered a “public health risk
to other States requiring a coordinated international response.” 69
The drafters of the IHR (2005) included important limitations on the measures states could impose when facing a public
health “event.” 70 These limitations may be categorized in two non-mutually exclusive ways: 1) individual human rights
and 2) the harmonization of the IHR with other international agreements. Individual rights, especially those historically
*732 characterized as “civil” or “political,” often faced curtailment in the name of public health measures. Isolation
and quarantine, for example, impose significant restrictions on individual liberty. Under the IHR (2005):
For a public health measure to restrict a civil and political right lawfully, the measure must (1) respond to
a pressing public or social need; (2) pursue a legitimate aim; (3) be proportionate to the legitimate aim; and
(4) be no more restrictive than is required to achieve the purpose sought by restricting the right. The rightsrestricting measure must also be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner (International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Articles 2.1 and 26). 71

State Parties may implement health measures that achieve the same or greater level of health protection as WHO
recommendations. However, they must be based on scientific principles, available scientific evidence, relevant guidance
or advice from WHO, and cannot be more restrictive of international traffic or more invasive or intrusive to persons
than reasonably available alternatives that would achieve the appropriate level of health protection. 72
These provisions are explored, infra, as dovetailing with health exceptions and rules of interpretation provided in WTO
agreements, especially TRIPS. Because the 2005 IHR do not have a strong enforcement mechanism, 73 this ultimately
privileges WTO jurisprudence as the benchmark by which public health measures that states implement are evaluated.
Indeed, during the IHR negotiation process:
WHO member states expressed concerns that the expanded scope of the new IHR would bring the
Regulations into conflict with other international agencies and treaties that addressed cross-border health
risks - e.g., the International Atomic Energy Agency (nuclear accidents); the World Trade Organization
(health measures that restrict international trade); and the Codex Alimentarius Commission (food
standards and guidelines to protect consumer health and promote trade in safe products). WHO addressed
these concerns by demonstrating that few conflicts existed; amending the negotiating text to remove
the small number of possible conflicts; and adding provisions to facilitate cooperation and coordination
between WHO and other international organizations (e.g., Articles 14, 17(f), 57.1). 74

*733 The first meaningful test of the 2005 IHR occurred in the context of the outbreak of the H1N1 influenza virus in
2009, although the outbreak of avian flu in Indonesia in 2007 also tested the IHR's underlying principles. These episodes
demonstrated the confrontation between intellectual property and public health as well as the role middle-income states

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

9

Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only

MULTIPOLARITY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE..., 35 Mich. J. Int'l L. 715

played in advancing the public health agenda. In 2007, Indonesia refused to share flu samples precisely because of past
experiences in which Western firms patented genetic material in order to manufacture unaffordable vaccines.
3. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
Parallel to negotiations over the revised IHR, the World Health Organization also oversaw the drafting of its first
public health treaty, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (“FCTC”). Just as the surge in old and new
infectious agents--tied in a significant way to globalization--prompted calls for an improved set of International Health
Regulations, the FCTC represented the culmination of decades of public health measures recommended by the World
Health Assembly but persistently undermined by a globally-coordinated effort undertaken by tobacco firms. 75
In 1995, Canada, Finland, Mexico, and Tanzania supported the idea of an international agreement 76 to regulate tobacco
at the World Health Assembly, which adopted Resolution 48.11, advocating the use of an “international instrument”
to curb global tobacco consumption. 77 Also, “[a] detailed outline of the proposed document was delivered . . . setting
forth various options for international legal strategy for tobacco control and recommending the development and
implementation of a WHO framework convention on tobacco control . . . to promote global cooperation and national
action for tobacco control.” 78 In 1999, Member States finally established both a WHO FCTC Working Group to draft
core treaty elements and an Intergovernmental Negotiating Body to develop the treaty text. 79
The FCTC was designed as a compromise solution between a purely recommendatory instrument and a binding
convention. The FCTC established *734 evidence-based provisions for curbing global tobacco consumption, many of
which focused on the advertising, labeling, marketing, packaging and promotion of tobacco products. 80 The convention
has been followed by additional action to enhance and clarify the strength and scope of the treaty. 81 The progress of this
action, however, has progressed unevenly. The FCTC's Conference of the Parties (“COP”) quickly adopted implementing
guidelines for some of the treaty's mandates, but struggled to adopt others. A protocol on illicit trade in tobacco products
languished for years in the COP. Notwithstanding those efforts, the FCTC was adopted by Member States in 2003 and
entered into force on February 27, 2005. 82 One hundred and seventy-eight parties have ratified or acceded to the FCTC
as of June 2014. 83
C. Proposed Conventions
The somewhat disputed success of the International Code, the IHR and the FCTC have led prominent public health
scholars and organizations to call for an increase in the number of issue-areas over which national public health measures
may be elevated to international fora and to call for a more comprehensive, global approach to international public
health challenges.
1. Framework Convention on Alcohol Control
While modest in comparison to tobacco, the disease burden imposed by alcohol consumption is substantial. Alcohol
consumption not only results in greater harm to third parties relative to other drugs like cocaine and heroin, 84 but also
has substantial deleterious effects on users, such as increased risks of cancer and heart disease, traffic accidents, burns,
poisonings, and drownings. 85 Additionally, alcohol consumption facilitates risky *735 sexual behavior, contributing
to the spread of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. 86
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In 2010, the WHO published a report titled “Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol” (the Report) 87 in
which it concluded that “2.5 million people worldwide died of alcohol-related causes in 2004, including 320,000 young
people between 15 and 29 years of age.” 88 WHO recommended a number of interventions consistent with analogous
FCTC mandates, including: educating people on the consequences of alcohol abuse; restricting the sale of alcohol to
minors; implementing comprehensive marketing restrictions; increasing taxes on alcohol products; and addressing illicit
or informally produced alcohol. The Report is not binding: it merely serves as a guide for member nations when adopting
their own alcohol control laws. Organizations like the American Public Health Association, 89 the American Society of
Addiction Medicine, 90 the World Medical Association, as well as leading medical journals advocated an international
alcohol control treaty based in significant part on the FCTC and WHO recommendations. 91 Editors of one of these
journals, the Lancet, have also posed the question as to the desirability of a Framework Convention on Obesity Control
based in part on WHO's Global Strategy for Diet, Physical Activity and Health. 92
2. Framework Convention on Global Health
Without explicitly criticizing the incrementalism inherent in an issue-by-issue approach to international public health
law, 93 noted public health scholar and advocate Lawrence Gostin and his collaborators have endorsed a comprehensive
approach to meet the “basic survival needs” of all humans through a Framework Convention on Global Health. 94
Uniting the broad agreement between governments on a human right to health as *736 well as the health-related
aspects of the Millennium Development Goals, Gostin argues that a FCGH would address the substandard living
conditions in many developing states. 95 These basic survival needs are sanitation and sewage, pest control, clean air and
water, tobacco reduction, diet and nutrition, essential medicines and vaccines, and functioning health systems for the
prevention, detection, and mitigation of disease and premature death. 96 The Framework Convention on Global Health
would commit states to certain forms of support for these objectives, 97 facilitate cooperation and formation of expert
communities addressing them, and impose a range of mechanisms to enforce commitments. 98
Under the current vision of the agreement, WHO would coordinate states' commitment “to a set of targets, both
economic and logistic, and [the dismantling of barriers] to constructive engagement by the private and charitable
sectors.” 99 In legal terms, a FCGH could “commit states to specific action . . . targeting the unhealthy conditions that
combine with poverty to exacerbate and perpetuate inequality.” 100
The FCGH would be implemented in stages through FCTC-like governance structures including a conference of the
parties, secretariat, technical advisory body and representative roles for civil society groups. 101 Initially, the FCGH
would emphasize capacity building, 102 priority setting, *737 103 engaging stakeholders, 104 activity coordination, 105
and progress evaluation and monitoring. 106
3. Medical Research and Innovation Treaty
Because of the controversial relationship between intellectual property rights, the changing nature of pharmaceutical
financing and innovation and access to medicines in developing countries, the World Health Organization has
undertaken a series of studies aimed at addressing the failure of a robust IP-rights protection regime to generate the
medicines and technologies developing countries need most. 107 Drugs for diseases for which treatments are available
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are too expensive because of patents and trademarks, while the diseases for which the market will likely be paltry attract
little research and development funding. 108 Helping to address this deficit are efforts coordinated with the World Trade
Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization as well as major international charities. In 2012, the
WHO's Consultative Expert Working Group published Research and Development to Meet Health Needs in Developing
Countries: Strengthening Global Financing and Coordination, in which it called for a binding framework treaty to
address innovation and research capacity in developing countries and to design a system to promote development of
treatments through incentive and other financing mechanisms. 109
The CEWG's report extensively covered the obstacles strong IP protections pose for addressing medical research and
development needs in *738 developing countries. The report squarely addressed existing IP instruments, viewing a
medical research and innovation “convention not as a replacement for the existing intellectual property rights system
but as a supplementary instrument where the current system does not function” and emphasizing the need for research
and development breakthroughs to be developed by other researchers. 110 The recommended elements of the proposed
treaty suggest the difficulties member states face for attempts to manage IP rights in a health-based treaty. For example,
the only element of the proposed treaty that specifically mentions intellectual property reads:
[A global strategy on public health, innovation and intellectual property will] encourage and support the
application and management of intellectual property in a manner that maximizes health-related innovation,
especially to meet the R&D needs of developing countries, protects public health and promotes access to
medicines for all, as well as explore and implement, where appropriate, possible incentive schemes for R&D.

This provision might be read to introduce some modification of the strong IP rights that now characterize
multilateral trade as well as bilateral and regional investment treaties. But it also obscures an underlying ambiguity-“managing intellectual property to maximize health-related innovation” might easily accommodate the current views of
pharmaceutical patent holders who argue that long periods of exclusive control are precisely the kind of incentive they
need to maximize health-related innovation. 111
D. Public-Private Partnerships
It is in the context of the growing ties between the private and public sectors that public health activists, scholars and
organizations refer to the growing importance of “governance” in solving public health problems at the international
level, a phrase which wraps together individuals, governments, firms, agencies and charities. 112 Indeed, the World
Health Organization's Constitution incorporated the role of non-governmental *739 organizations, who by 1948 had
undertaken significant efforts toward eradicating infectious diseases and caring for injured and sick persons. 113
The Global Fund, for example, is a public-private partnership dedicated to collecting and allocating resources and funds
for “a world free from the burden of AIDS, TB and malaria.” 114 Each needs-based country has control over its own
implementation of measures to prevent the spread of these diseases and is provided funding based on the effectiveness
of the measures used. 115 Despite pockets of political unpopularity and misuse of money, Global Fund claims to have
saved 6.5 million lives since its establishment. 116 Three million people have been provided AIDS treatment, over 7.7
million have been treated for TB, and over 160 million insecticide treated bed nets have been distributed. 117
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Similarly, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, together with WHO, UNICEF, the World Bank and major
pharmaceutical firms, established the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (“GAVI”). GAVI is funded
through the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFI), which is itself funded by the governments of
Australia, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 118 Eligible
states determine their immunization needs, apply for funding support, and administer approved vaccination programs.
Under GAVI's Advance Market Commitment (AMC) program, donors commit funds to guarantee the price of vaccines
once they have been developed. In exchange, companies promise to provide the vaccines at an affordable price to
developing countries. 119
Global Fund and GAVI represent just two examples of public-private partnerships, which number in the hundreds,
and health-related NGOs, which number in the tens of thousands. 120 The participation of major non- *740
governmental organizations in global public health is not new, although the innovations current ones are introducing into
administration and management are. 121 In some ways, public-private partnerships are better able to balance IP rights
with their public health missions, working as they do within the strong patent regimes donors generally enjoy. 122 Global
Fund and GAVI, for example, are theoretically able to manage a range of supplier behaviors through their contracts. 123
II. THE EXPANSION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT TREATIES
With the exception of public-private partnerships, the international coordination agreements outlined above are
dependent on traditional notions of treaty compliance including reciprocity, transparency, legitimacy, mobilization
and vertical integration (i.e., international rules and standards are internalized into national law). 124 There are weak
or no enforcement mechanisms to speak of, the benefits of coordination and mobilization serving as their own
justifications. Whatever the strengths of these justifications, they are threatened by a nearly perfect parallel development
in international law: international intellectual property protection. Yet unlike the enforcement mechanisms embedded
in international public health law instruments, intellectual property rights holders enjoy, almost uniformly, enforceable
rights in these international agreements, even when they conflict with public health measures.
These agreements range from the protections given intellectual property rights holders under regional and multilateral
trade treaties to the broad scope of legal protections given both “investors” and “investments” *741 under bilateral
investment treaties. The upshot of these parallel, contradictory legal mechanisms is the frustration of global health
law objectives like reduced tobacco use, expanded access to vaccines in the event of pandemic or even the creation of
mutual trust necessary for international public health treaties to work. The end result is that robust IP protection that
accompanies trade liberalization works in persistent opposition to public health objectives. 125
A. The 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
Contemporaneously with late nineteenth century efforts to establish the first international public health law treaties, a
small group of states sought to protect their citizens' industrial and intellectual property as they moved across borders. 126
Disparate national patent and trademark regimes meant that rights holders in one state might lose patent or trademark
protection in another if they did not simultaneously file for protection in all relevant states. 127 Like public health law,
intellectual property law was essentially national in nature, though growing international trade mobilized efforts toward
an international approach to legal barriers for IP. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property created
a legal union between participating states in which foreign industrial design, patent and trademark applications received
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the same treatment as national applications; covered intellectual property first protected in one state received priority in
other participating states; and codified some common substantive protections. 128 The treaty also specifically addressed
forms of unfair competition not related to patents or trademarks, provisions that were subsequently strengthened when
the parties revised the treaty in several conferences from 1886 to 1967. 129 Membership in the treaty grew from 11 parties
in 1883 to 174 in 2013.
*742 While the treaty never specifically addressed the relationship between international intellectual property
protection and public health, it did create exceptions that foreshadowed the principal conflicts occurring between
1994 and 2012. Compulsory licenses were always contemplated for public health reasons, while the addition of Article
6quinquies(B)(iii) in 1934 allowed the denial of registration or the invalidation of trademarks that might mislead
consumers. 130 In short, the Paris Convention, later incorporated into the WTO's TRIPS Agreement, provided broad
exceptions for the compulsory licensing of patents related to medicines and prohibited trademarks that might create false
impressions as to products' health-related attributes. 131
Like public health treaties originating at the same time, the Paris Convention tended to suffer from underenforcement
as well as the absence of a specific forum to which an aggrieved IP rights holder might resort. Compliance and
complaints were largely diplomatic matters. 132 For example, the international organization created to administer the
Paris Convention and, later, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works-- the United
International Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property (“BIRPI,” its French acronym 133 )--never enjoyed
more than a formal coordinating role and was, strictly speaking, an arm of the Swiss government. 134
From 1893 to 1967, BIRPI oversaw revisions to the major treaties including the ways in which the agreements would
govern new technologies; entry by newly independent former colonies; and increasing efforts to include substantive
law in the treaties. 135 In 1967, the parties agreed to transform BIRPI into an international organization, the World
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), which operated formally from 1970 and as a specialized agency of the
United Nations from 1974. WIPO has largely overseen the growing body of IPR harmonization and substantive law
treaties like the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the Trademark Law Treaty and the (slowly forming) Substantive Patent
Law Treaty. It is funded largely through fees paid by private users of the treaties it develops. 136 *743 Because WIPO
became a specialized agency of the United Nations in the same period that developing and newly independent states were
pressing for a New International Economic Order, it never fully served the interests of strong international intellectual
property protections. 137
B. International Trade Law
International intellectual property law became decidedly more influential when it was not only folded in with the
international free trade regime, but was equipped with judicial enforcement requirements that gave IP rights holders
the capability to enforce those rights in domestic courts and administrative tribunals. Because the Paris Convention
and other efforts at international IP protection had failed to satisfy the demands of states with strong IP rights-holding
constituencies, individual states had often regulated IP practices through domestic trade statutes.
For example, in the United States, Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act “authorizes the President to take all appropriate
action, including retaliation, to obtain the removal of any act, policy, or practice of a foreign government that violates
an international trade agreement or is unjustified, unreasonable, or discriminatory, and that burdens or restricts U.S.
commerce.” Private IP rights holders were authorized to file 301 petitions, many of which focused on failures to protect
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IP rights abroad. In 1988, Congress enhanced Section 301 by requiring the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
to compile “Special 301” Reports which identify countries that do not provide “adequate and effective protection”
of intellectual property rights or “fair and equitable market access for persons that rely on intellectual property
protection.” 138
Yet even efforts like these confront diplomatic and political limits. For example, the 2011 Report identified two key U.S.
allies, Canada and Israel, as having “serious intellectual property rights deficiencies,” yet resolving those deficiencies
is likely to be complicated by other diplomatic, commercial and strategic priorities. 139 Therefore, from states with
powerful IP rights-holding constituencies, the desirability of an agreement that gave automatic rights to enforceability
was obvious.
1. The WTO
After the failure of the International Trade Organization to obtain US support during the Truman administration,
the less centralized General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) became the organizing treaty under which states
reduced official or governmental barriers to trade. *744 Through eight rounds of negotiations stretching over more
than 40 years, trading states gradually lowered tariffs as well as “non-tariff barriers” to trade like customs procedures,
import licensing requirements and export subsidies. The so-called Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations commenced
in 1986 and lasted through 1994, when the World Trade Organization was established.
The “World Trade Organization” refers to about 60 agreements, several of which affect participating states' ability to
establish and regulate their health systems. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) governs potentially
trade-restrictive public health regulations while the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) requires that states pass laws providing foreign intellectual-property rights holders with a number of
administrative and judicial protections. The Agreement on Sanitary and Photosanitary Measures (SPS) establishes the
principles by which states may regulate food safety. The WTO agreements provide for relatively circumscribed situations
in which public health measures may prevail over liberal trading rules. 140
2. TRIPS
TRIPS is by far the most controversial of the WTO agreements with respect to international public health law. 141
Unlike the general theory of reducing barriers to trade that justified GATT, TRIPS was theoretically justified by the
need to increase legal protections for intellectual property rights holders in order to facilitate the expansion of products,
processes, accompanying trademarks, and creative works into new markets. 142
Many economists agree that in most circumstances, eliminating barriers to trade between nations is net welfare increasing
for each nation and for the global economy. Indeed, economists argue that a state should adopt open trade policies even
if others do not. As Paul Krugman puts it, “[i]f economists ruled the world, there would be no need for a World Trade
Organization. The economist's case for free trade is essentially a unilateral case: a country serves its own interests by
pursuing free trade regardless of what other countries may do.” 143
The issue of the optimal level of intellectual property protection, however, is not so straightforward. Most economists
agree that nations should adopt some intellectual property laws, although what the content of these *745 laws should
be is a matter of significant disagreement. Intellectual property rules involve distributional issues. 144
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TRIPS' approach was to grant patent, copyright and trademark holders rights to certain minimal statutory protections
as well as resort to administrative and judicial processes to enforce those rights. 145 Member states may pass protections
greater than those detailed in TRIPS 146 but additional protections must be extended to nationals of other member
states. 147 In addition to substantive provisions, TRIPS also outlines a comprehensive framework for civil adjudication
of IP rights. 148 Member states must create private causes of action 149 as well as remedies including injunctions, money
damages, and the use of border restrictions. 150 States must also give IP rights holders access to judicial review of all
administrative decisions concerning their IP laws. 151
Prior to the Uruguay Round, the trade liberalization negotiation process had been largely driven by the trade agenda
of developed states; agriculture was for the most part excluded and the important bargains were struck between the
industrialized countries. 152 The Uruguay Round, by contrast, involved a greater range of issues, many of which were
long-standing priorities of developing states. Their interests in lowering barriers to trade in agricultural goods, clothes
and textiles resulted in a “grand bargain” in which they agreed to impose strong monopoly protections for copyrights,
trademarks, and, most importantly from the North American, Japanese and European perspective, copyrights and
patents. 153
*746 With respect to the relationship between the international public health law movement and the international
intellectual property protection movement, the Uruguay Round decidedly subordinated the former to the latter.
Developing states won some flexibility with respect to implementation of TRIPS obligations, most notably through
Articles 7 and 8, which respectively emphasized the need for intellectual property rules to allow for development and
technology transfer as well as measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition. 154 Article 8 did not provide
a general public health exemption from TRIPS implementation but rather conditioned those measures on TRIPS
compliance. 155 Meanwhile, Article 31 of TRIPS allows for nonconsensual authorizations of patents--a provision whose
importance was elevated by the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health--but requires that those
authorizations be accompanied by appellate access to national courts or “direct higher authority.” 156
These protections effectively imparted individually enforceable rights to IP rights holders. Jerome Reichmann detailed
how strong these rights may be: “[Developed countries] expect developing countries to implement [their] obligations
concerning domestic, judicial and administrative enforcement of foreigners' intellectual property rights, including
detailed provisions governing the discovery of evidence, rights to counsel, injunctions, damages and temporary
restraining orders. These provisions mean business.” 157 States Parties are not required to allocate more resources toward
enforcement of IP rights than “law in general,” so many individual IP rights-holders may not see a sufficient payoff to
invest resources in pursuing individual civil actions to vindicate property rights. But the economic sectors most closely
tied to human health--food, tobacco, alcohol and pharmaceuticals--are precisely those in which IP rights holders are
most likely to try to preserve substantial investments in advertising, research and development. 158
3. SPS and TBT Agreements
Relatedly, measures affecting the labeling of food or beverage containers may not only be challenged on the grounds
that they affect trademarks on packaging and labeling, but also as trade-restrictive regulations under the SPS and TBT
agreements. These agreements do not apply to *747 intellectual property rights per se but may, together with IP rights
claims, cumulatively weigh against public health interventions. The SPS Agreement authorizes states to adopt “sanitary
and phytosanitary” measures to ensure the safety of food and the prevention of imported pests and diseases, but limits
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the trade restrictiveness of those measures and encourages the use of internationally accepted standards like those issued
by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (“Codex”). 159 Empowering Codex standards for their WTO relevance has
correspondingly pressured decisions toward their free trade compatibility. Emily Lee has detailed this process in the
following way:
The standard-setting process seems to present a unique “democratic” setting in which industry
representatives, government officials, and NGOs can negotiate and forge a unified position, but in practice,
the distribution of influence is weighted heavily to reflect industry concerns. The composition of national
delegations in Codex meetings increasingly reflects the commercial importance of Codex decisions, as does
the increasing difficulty in the negotiation of general principles for the elaboration of standards. Also,
“Proceedings of the Commission often have turned into trade battlegrounds and forums for deregulation
where decisions tend to reflect political compromises designed to promote international trade at the expense
of human health.” 160

European Union officials, for example, argued in 1994 that U.S. nutrition labels restricted trade. 161
Similarly, the TBT Agreement encourages states to base regulatory measures on international standards when available
and appropriate. The easiest way to accomplish this is by adopting an accepted international *748 standard like
those issued by the International Standards Organization (“ISO”). However, the process by which those standards are
developed are not only opaque, but are dominated by the industries affected by the standards issued. The tobacco
industry, for example, used the ISO standard for low-tar labeling as part of its broader effort to convince the public that
a “safer” cigarette existed. 162
4. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (“ACTA”) 163 represents the codification of principles advanced in a number
of initiatives undertaken by developed states to enhance protections for intellectual property holders beyond what TRIPS
achieved. 164 According to the U.S. Trade Representative, “the goal [of ACTA] is to set a new, higher benchmark
for enforcement that countries can join on a voluntary basis. . . . ACTA will include commitments in three areas:
(1) strengthening international cooperation, (2) improving enforcement practices, and (3) providing a strong legal
framework for IPR enforcement.” 165 After eleven rounds of negotiations, the final ACTA text was adopted 166 in May
2011. 167
*749 Originally aiming to combat the counterfeiting of goods and piracy in international markets, ACTA contains
increased criminal sanctions for IPRs infringement and stronger border measures 168 to target illegal trafficking in
infringing goods through customs processes. 169 ACTA requires, under each Party's available laws, “enforcement
procedures . . . to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this
Agreement.” 170 While commentators have detailed criticisms of those measures specifically (especially border controls),
this section will focus on ACTA's civil enforcement provisions. 171
Under ACTA, “[e]ach Party shall make available to right holders civil judicial procedures concerning the enforcement
of any [IPR].” 172 Among those procedures are injunctions, 173 damages, 174 other remedies, 175 and the collection and
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preservation of evidence. 176 These civil enforcement provisions are not limited to first-party infringers. “Each Party
shall provide that, in civil judicial proceedings concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights, its judicial
authorities shall have the authority to order against a party to desist from infringement an order to that party or where
appropriate to a third party over whom the relevant judicial authority exercises jurisdiction . . . to prevent infringing
goods from entering the channels of commerce.”
ACTA represents a new restructuring of civil enforcement to increase the rights of IP holders, with potentially deleterious
effects on access to medicines. 177 For example, because ACTA requires that judicial authorities *750 have the power to
issue injunctions against third parties, any intermediary provider of generic medicines to developing countries potentially
faces liability under the ACTA regime. 178 According to Brook Baker
In the context of access to medicines, the concept “intermediary services” may be quite ominous. Services
are obviously provided by ISPs - allowing supplier to market medicines online - and in the pharmaceutical
context, by shipping agents . . . . Perhaps more ominously, many others who helped fund or facilitate
purchases of generic drugs, as they moved through the stream of international commerce from producer to
consumer could face intermediary liability. For example, the Global Fund solicits and funds country-led
proposals for funding priority disease prevention, treatment, and care. 179

ACTA-compliant laws may enable foreign rights holders to target local industries through threats or the use of
litigation. 180 The force of the agreement extends beyond its power to shape domestic law, as it will inevitably also
form the template for future bilateral agreements between ACTA and non-ACTA states. 181 The Trans-Pacific Strategic
Economic Partnership Agreement (“TPPA”) mimics many of ACTA's IP provisions, although its conclusion is more
distant. 182
C. Bilateral and Regional Trade and Investment Treaties
More common than broad, multilateral trade instruments like TRIPS and ACTA, bilateral and regional investment
and trade agreements contain some of the strongest protections for intellectual property. 183 Bilateral investment
treaties (“BITs”), for example, take a number of forms and include provisions authorizing IP rights-holders to vindicate
claims in national or international courts or dispute resolution fora. Generally, BITs are negotiated between developed
and developing states. 184 BITs contain *751 provisions guaranteeing investors from one state protections for their
investments in the other state; these protections often define IP rights in broad terms. These guarantees may include fair
and equitable or non-discriminatory treatment, 185 free transfer of profits and currency, and, in many cases, payment
of compensation should a host state adopt measures having the effect of direct or indirect expropriation. 186 The origin
and number of BITs in existence is well-documented, although the reasons for their proliferation remain in dispute. 187
At the end of the 1980s, records at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development showed 385 BITs; a decade later,
the number reached 1,857. 188 Current estimates show approximately 3,000 BITs in force. 189
BITs do not, typically, include enumerated rights for contracting states outside their ability to prohibit certain economic
activities altogether, exempt certain economic sectors from the treaty's applicability or to take normal regulatory action in
the interest of national security, public order, public health or public morality--so-called “non-precluded measures.” 190
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Contracting states are still potentially obligated to compensate investors for these “regulatory takings.” Public health
exceptions, for example, are often phrased in vague ways in the preamble, undermining their use as a defense to an
investor claim. 191 Most of these treaties provide investors access to one of the major international arbitral tribunals to
vindicate rights under a BIT. 192
These treaties often give much stronger protection, with fewer standard exceptions, to intellectual property rights than
international IP agreements, TRIPS or domestic law. For example, the Swiss-Uruguayan BIT protects as investments
“copyrights, industrial property rights (such as patents of inventions, utility models, industrial designs or models, trade or
*752 service marks, trade names, indications of source or appellation of origin), know-how and good-will” and requires
the counterparty to compensate an investor for “measures [taken directly or indirectly] of expropriation, nationalization
or any other measure having the same nature or the same effect.” 193 Under the 2012 U.S. Model BIT, an “‘investment’
means every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly . . . includ[[ing] . . . intellectual property
rights.” IP rights are accorded similar rights as though they were real property like land or a manufacturing facility, the
traditional covered investments, although the U.S. Model BIT creates an explicit nexus between rights to compensation
and measures consistent with TRIPS. 194
Indeed, if TRIPS represented the ceiling of substantive IP rights and accompanying enforcement agreements, the
entire debate on the balance between TRIPS and public health might focus on flexibilities available in the language of
the agreement. 195 But the flexibilities that WTO member states might enjoy under TRIPS are narrowed, sometimes
drastically, in bilateral investment and trade treaties. For example, the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement includes
limitations on compulsory licenses and parallel imports. The costliest TRIPS-plus terms are those that impose “data
exclusivity” separate from patent protection. Under “data exclusivity” regimes, a generic drug manufacturer is not
allowed to use clinical and safety trial data from the initial drug application. This essentially requires the generics
applicant to undertake prohibitively expensive clinical trials, and imposes on the government or end user the cost that
generics theoretically exist to save. As Oxfam indicates:
These expenditures have required that both public health system and individuals pay higher prices for many
new medicines that are needed to treat serious non-communicable diseases (NCDs), such as hypertension,
asthma, diabetes, and mental illness. For example, new medicines to treat diabetes and heart disease cost
anywhere from two to six times more in Jordan than in Egypt, where there are no TRIPS-plus barriers. 196

Similar conflicts have arisen over alcohol, food and tobacco regulation. When Uruguay introduced measures restricting
the images, colors, words and phrases that could appear on cigarette packages, Phillip Morris International's Swiss
subsidiaries challenged the constitutionality of the *753 regulations under Uruguayan law. 197 PMI failed in the
Uruguayan courts before ultimately availing itself of a bilateral investment treaty between Switzerland and Uruguay
which not only gave PMI's trademarks much stronger protections than under either international trade or Uruguayan
law, but also placed significant limitations on the Uruguayan courts to serve as the final authority on the dispute. 198
III. CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN IP RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
As international public health law and international intellectual property law have strengthened, so have the conflicts
anticipated by each movement's advocates. Between 1994 and 2012, the conflict between international intellectual
property rights and international public health law confronted parties to each of the major agreements outlined above
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and foreshadowed conflicts that would arise during the negotiation of potential agreements under instruments like
the Medical Research and Innovation Treaty, the Framework Convention on Alcohol Control and the Framework
Convention on Global Health. As the discussion of these episodes shows, international public health law exercised little
normative force over strong intellectual property rights. Instead, international public health law norms prevailed most
often when sponsored by a strong middle income states like Brazil, India, South Africa or Thailand. 199
A. Guatemala, Brazil, India, the Philippines and the 1981 WHO Code on the Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
Guatemala represents precisely the kind of state for which the 1981 WHO Code on the Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes was intended. Its “infant mortality rate is 55 per 1,000 live births and the maternal
mortality rate is 110 per 100,000 live births.” 200 Also, “approximately 16 percent of infants suffer from
low birth weight, and approximately 50 percent of all children are malnourished.” 201

*754 In 1983, Guatemala adopted Law 66-83, Law on the Protection of Breastfeeding, which codified many aspects of
the WHO International Code, and in 1987 the Ministry of Health implemented the law through Governmental Order
No. 847-87. In 1992, Gerber applied to introduce a new “step-by-step” product line in Guatemala and requested that the
products be registered with the Food & Drugs Registration and Control Division, Guatemala's equivalent of the United
States' FDA. The FDRC required that Gerber remove its trademarked infant image, include a notice that “breastmilk is
the best for baby” as required under the law and further specify the age of the child for which the products were intended.
Gerber pursued a three-prong strategy in response: asserting the products were “complementary” foods under
Guatemalan law and therefore not covered by 66-83 and 841-87; bringing a statutory action under U.S. law to eliminate
Guatemala's trading preferences for effectively “nationalizing” its trademark; and threatening Guatemala's compliance
with (still pending) TRIPS provisions. Gerber argued that:
Article 15 of [TRIPS] states that “The nature of the goods or services to which a trademark is to be applied
shall in no case form an obstacle to registration of the trademark.” In addition, Article 20 of the proposed
agreement provides in relevant part that “[t]he use of a trademark in the course of trade shall not be
unjustifiably encumbered by special requirements, such as . . . use in a special form or use in a manner
detrimental to its capability to distinguish the goods . . . . 202

Applying a strained interpretation of “complementary foods,” the Guatemalan Supreme Court of Justice determined
that 66-83 and 841-87 applied only to locally prepared foods, not imported goods. Without explicitly acknowledging
the role that the trade-based agreements played in their construction of the law, “the case . . . shows . . . that raising the
spectre of the new WTO can be an effective pressure tool against small countries that want to implement strong health
regulations that may also have negative impacts on commercial interests.” 203
The Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines successfully delayed and then earned relief from
comprehensive labeling restrictions through similar arguments, based in part on the trade-restrictive effect of warnings
on formula containers. 204
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*755 Brazil, by contrast, fully incorporated the Code into law in 1988, embedded subsequent WHA resolutions into
administrative regulations, and authorized third-party monitoring. Breastfeeding rates have risen steadily as a result. 205
Like Guatemala's law, Brazil prohibited infant images on breastmilk substitute packaging. When Gerber entered the
Brazilian market, it accepted the prohibition on its infant image. Similarly, in India, where the Infant Milk Substitutes
Act adopted a prohibition on images of infants, women, or “phrases designed to increase the saleability of infant milk
substitutes or infant food,” exclusive breastfeeding at 4-5 months of age is 46%, three times that of the Philippines. 206
B. Brazil, India, South Africa, Thailand and Access to Medicines
Access to medicines was a principal concern of developing states during the TRIPS negotiations. Many developing
states considered the high prices that accompanied patented medicines and their production processes to frustrate their
constitutional and international human rights obligations to provide affordable health care to their citizens.
1. Compulsory Licenses and Parallel Imports
In addition to the generally worded provisions in Articles 7 and 8, TRIPS also includes a compulsory licensing
regime under which member states may authorize third-party firms to manufacture patented products or use patented
processes. 207 Article 31 obligates states to negotiate with patent holders over the terms of these licenses unless they
involve a “case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.” 208 TRIPS does not explicitly
address parallel import policies, which are used to purchase patented drugs from a third state where a lower price is
charged.
Beginning with South Africa's experience with parallel imports in 1997, Brazil, India, South Africa and Thailand have
not only led the way in using these alternatives to expand access to medicines for their own citizens, but have also helped
to obtain collective gains for developing countries generally. The confrontation between South Africa and Western
pharmaceutical firms, paralleled by Brazil's compulsory license regime for AIDS drugs, achieved at least two key
victories. First, sponsoring governments withdrew opposition to compulsory licensing for HIV medications. Second, the
episodes prompted states to revisit the TRIPS agreement in light of outbreaks and the reemergence of infectious diseases
with disproportionate effects in developing countries. The 2001 Doha Declaration on *756 the TRIPS Agreement
on Public Health emphasized the importance of compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other
epidemics and affirmed the freedom for states to establish their own regimes for parallel imports. 209 The final text was
ultimately negotiated between the U.S. and Brazil, the former broadly representing states with strong IP rights holding
constituencies, the latter representing developing countries pressing for wider access to affordable medications. 210
In 2007, Thailand expanded the use of compulsory licenses beyond the communicable diseases specified in the Doha
Declaration, granting a compulsory license for the heart disease medication marketed as Plavix. Thailand also issued
compulsory licenses for four cancer drugs, the disease burden of which is heavier than HIV/AIDS. 211 Indeed, “[f]rom
the Thai government's point of view, cancer ‘is no less serious than HIV/AIDS.”’ 212 Similarly, in 2012 India granted
a compulsory license for kidney and liver cancer medications. 213 Indeed, since 1995 “[m]ore than half the compulsory
licensing episodes occurred in upper-middle-income countries (including Brazil and Thailand).” 214
These episodes might be equally construed as protecting powerful domestic industries (e.g. India's generics firms) 215
rather than exhibiting any form of solidarity these states feel with the plight of developing countries facing large disease
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burdens. 216 That is the point. It may not be norm creation *757 or force flowing from the Doha Declaration that
has resulted in compulsory license activity, but rather the political and economic strength of the licensing states that
has allowed wider access to affordable medicine, even as international intellectual property protections become stronger
and more widespread.
2. TRIPS Flexibilities and Model Laws
Compulsory licenses and parallel imports are relatively drastic actions to narrow otherwise strong patent rights. But
states also have a number of other ways in which strong intellectual property rights called for in TRIPS can be diminished.
For example, states are under no obligation to allocate greater resources to criminal enforcement of IP rights. If a state
restricts the use of its criminal prosecution priorities to non-IP matters, IP rights holders must rely on the civil justice
system to vindicate their rights. Although, as noted above, this flexibility may not deter patent and trademark holders
in the areas most closely related to health.
States are also free to establish their own standards for patentability, including novelty, non-obviousness and utility. 217
For example, India passed a patent protection statute that presumptively meets the minimum requirements of TRIPS,
granting 20-year exclusivity, for example, but defining “novelty” and “efficacy” in ways that prevent firms from
“evergreening” their patents by filing patent applications with marginally different applications or modalities from the
protected patents. 218 Novartis, which had attempted to extend the patent on its cancer treatment drug Gleevec, lost in
India's trial courts on even establishing the grounds for a new patent. India's Intellectual Property Appellate Board (which
had assumed jurisdiction over patents as a result of TRIPS) determined that it had in fact met the basic requirements of
patentability but failed scrutiny under a more specific provision of India's patent act, which erected a high barrier for drug
efficacy. The Supreme Court of India affirmed the IPAB's decision that the patent failed India's criteria for novelty. 219
Section 3(d) of India's Patent Act, which limits the possibility of evergreening patents, is in the process of being replicated
in the Philippines, *758 while other developing nations are also likely to use that section as a model. 220 Furthermore,
Brazil's compulsory licensing scheme for AIDS drugs has served as model for other Latin American jurisdictions. 221
In addition, Brazil used its economic power to negotiate bargains on behalf of Latin American governments seeking
lower prices for medicines. 222
3. Action at the World Trade Organization
In 2008 and 2009, Dutch customs authorities seized at least 19 shipments of generic drugs transiting through the
Netherlands, 16 of which came from India. 223 Brazil and India initiated proceedings at the World Trade Organization to
challenge the Dutch and European laws under which the seizures were authorized. The states secured a promise from the
E.U. in July 2011 to end the seizures, but Dutch authorities seized another 29 cartons of medicine in December 2012 and
E.U. negotiators have balked at specifically addressing the border seizures in ongoing negotiations over an E.U.-India
Free Trade Agreement. 224 While Brazil and Indian complaints are technically in abeyance as long as the E.U. abides by
its agreement, they challenge a wide range of current IP practices in developed states. While larger markets like Brazil,
India and Thailand have managed to withstand pressure to include IP-rights strengthening provisions in investment and
trade agreements as well as use the international trading system to expand access to medicines, smaller markets, often
where the diseases impose higher morbidity and mortality, are buckling under pressure from more powerful countries.
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C. Indonesia and the International Health Regulations
The International Health Regulations depend on a number of identification, communication and treatment mechanisms
to address potential *759 pandemics. Vaccines, for example, are one of the most important lines of defense against the
emergence of pandemics. 225 The development and distribution of vaccines is dependent on patents on “genetic sequences
or proteins of the pandemic virus, as well as on novel methods for vaccine production, [and] the actual vaccine,” in
addition to chemicals which maximize the number of doses available from a given antigen or virus. 226
Strong patent protections pose at least two related threats to the functionality of the IHR with respect to preventing and
controlling epidemics. First, only a few companies have the infrastructure and technology for vaccine development, and
these companies are largely located in developed countries. 227 This concentration renders developing states potentially
dependent on wealthier states to manufacture and distribute vaccines in sufficient quantities to address their needs in
the case of disease outbreaks. Second, the origin of outbreaks, especially influenza, is often in developing states like
China, Indonesia and the Middle East. These states must therefore be willing to share disease samples and biological
material relevant to risk assessment, risk management, disease research and vaccine development. When firms patent
shared samples, vaccines become unaffordable and the willingness to share is undermined. 228
In 2006, Indonesia withheld H5N1 avian flu samples from WHO, undermining efforts to monitor and produce vaccines
in response to an avian flu outbreak that rapidly spread worldwide. 229 Indonesia asserted that its decision was a response
to an Australian company's development of a vaccine derived from a virus sample Indonesia provided to WHO. 230 The
cycle demonstrated the inequities inherent in the global disease surveillance system established by the IHR. As David
Fidler observed:
Developing countries provided information and virus samples to the WHO-operated system;
pharmaceutical companies in industrialized countries then obtained free access to such samples, exploited
them, and patented the resulting products, which the developing countries could not afford. 231

*760 Participation by Indonesia is in many ways crucial to the global surveillance system. He continues: “[w]ithout
access to Indonesia's influenza strains, global surveillance was jeopardized, as was the refinement of diagnostic reagents
and the development of intervention strategies, which depend on the information surveillance provides.” 232
In 2009, the outbreak of H1N1 influenza in Mexico demonstrated not only that the global surveillance system benefited
Western pharmaceutical firms, but also that in the case of a real pandemic, those firms' sponsoring governments could
not be relied upon to equitably share vaccines:
Canada awarded its vaccine contract to a Canadian company because it feared that foreign governments
might restrict exports to Canada because of vaccine shortages within their territories. The Australian
government made it clear to the Australian manufacturer CSL that it must fulfill the government's domestic
needs before exporting vaccine to the United States. The United States pledged on September 17, 2009,
to donate 10% of its vaccine purchases to WHO, but on October 28, US Secretary of Health and Human
Services Kathleen Sebelius stated that the United States would not donate H1N1 vaccine as promised
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until all at-risk Americans had access, because production problems had created shortages in the United
States. 233

Despite clear acknowledgment that the 2009 outbreak originated in Mexico and leveled its most significant toll there,
Mexico “‘had a terrifically difficult time getting access to the pandemic vaccine.”’ 234
As a result of these episodes, developing countries led by Indonesia pressed both WHO and developed states to conclude
an agreement on equitable access to pandemic vaccines. In 2011, the WHO Open-Ended Working Group of Member
States on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (“PIP”) finalized an agreement in which developing countries agreed to
routinely share mutating flu virus samples in exchange for options to reserve antiviral medications, real time vaccine
production, and/or IP licenses as well as monetary support commitments from vaccine manufacturers. Even at that, the
PIP framework was adopted under WHO's Article 23 recommendatory power, not its Article 19 treaty power 1or its
Article 21 regulation-issuing authority. Moreover, the Standard *761 Material Transfer Agreements appended to it are
largely deferential to the patent interests of manufacturers. 235
D. Australia, Uruguay and the FCTC
As with the International Code and the IHR, the WHO's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control engenders
confrontations with intellectual property rights, primarily trademarks. At least three of the FCTC tobacco-demand
reduction provisions involve or potentially involve conflicts with trademarks, especially on packaging and labeling. 236
Indeed, the visual imagery fundamentally tied to trademarks represents a chief investment by tobacco firms, which use
visual and written cues to prompt and manipulate demand for tobacco products. 237 Tobacco firms not only introduced
“light,” “mild” and “ultra-light” in their brands to suggest to consumers that “light” versions of cigarettes were safer,
they adapted label and packaging color schemes to convey that message; for example, “White-and-gold Marlboro Lights
will still suggest “lightness” just by the stark contrast to the red, full-strength Marlboros. The powder-blue Camel Lights
with their pastel camel will still look milder than the ornery desert-ocher animal on the regular ‘Filters' pack.” 238
To combat the potential misleading effects of cigarette packaging, Uruguay implemented a number of FCTC-compliant
tobacco control measures between 2008 and 2010, including two which addressed the manipulation of packaging
and labeling to shape health perceptions of tobacco products. First, the state required that pictorial warnings cover
eighty percent of a cigarette pack's surface. Second, Ministry of Health limited the sale of cigarettes to only one
variety per brand, the so-called single presentation requirement. 239 This part of the law prevents a firm from selling
multiple varieties of cigarette under a single trademark. For example, Philip Morris International (“PMI”), whose most
important asset is the Marlboro brand, could no longer sell Marlboro “Reds,” Marlboro “Greens,” and Marlboro
“Blues,” which leaves “Marlboros” as its only authorized variety (although it owns or licenses other brands in the
Uruguayan *762 market). 240 PMI first challenged the regulations in Uruguayan courts, seeking an injunction based
in part on Uruguay's revised, TRIPS-compliant trademark law. Unsuccessful in Uruguayan courts, PMI initiated
(through entities it controlled) arbitration proceedings under Switzerland's BIT with Uruguay. That treaty included
not only broad definitions of “investor” and “investment,” but also established narrow and toothless exceptions for
public health regulations and required even laws passed with assurance of due process to compensate an investor
for an “indirect” expropriation. 241 Despite the regulations falling squarely within the measures recommended by the
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (especially the Article 11 guidelines), the Uruguayan government vacillated

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

24

Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only

MULTIPOLARITY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE..., 35 Mich. J. Int'l L. 715

on withdrawing or moderating the measures until strong financial and political support emerged from the Bloomberg
Family Foundation, the World Health Organization and hundreds of public health NGOs. 242
Even before the FCTC, firms effectively used international trademark law to undermine strong tobacco control measures.
In 1992, Australian legislators considered imposing a “plain packaging” regime on cigarette manufacturers. 243 This
requirement provided that only the manufacturer's name could appear in standardized black font, and that the remainder
of *763 the package must remain an entirely uniform color, except for government-mandated health warnings. 244
British American Tobacco argued before the Australian Senate that the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property and Australian law would require compensation for the value of its cigarette brands. 245 The Australian
government rejected the proposed regulations. 246 The Ministry of Health announced that “[u] nfortunately, [the
proposal] is just not feasible. . . . We would have to buy the tobacco companies' trademarks, and that would cost us
hundreds of millions of dollars.” 247 Australia revived its plain packaging plan in 2011 and the government prevailed
in the High Court of Australia in 2012. In 2011, PMI initiated arbitration proceedings (again through a whollyowned entity) against Australia under a BIT in effect between itself and Hong Kong. 248 Ukraine quickly requested
consultations and the establishment of a dispute settlement panel under the auspices of the WTO, attracting the attention
of dozens of states interested in whether or not Australia's plain packaging regime is consistent with TRIPS, the TBT
Agreement and/or GATT. 249
E. Thailand and Pictorial Warnings on Alcoholic Beverage Containers
In January 2010, Thailand proposed legislation requiring that graphic warning labels cover thirty percent of the
surface of beer, wine and spirits containers. 250 The subsequent response by international alcoholic beverage firms
and their supporting governments mirrors the conflict between strong tobacco packaging and labeling regulations and
international intellectual property claims. The minutes from the meeting of the Committee on non-Tariff Barriers to
trade notes:
The US representative noted that Clause 3 of the draft regulation precluded US labels from having: “any
word or statement that misleads consumers to understand that alcoholic beverages are safe and good for
health or contain lower level of harmful substances compared with other alcoholic beverages or contains
*764 words or statements that directly or indirectly advertise the alcoholic beverage” . . . . to the extent
that a registered trademark contained any such description, this vague provision could result in trademarks
being prohibited on alcoholic beverage packaging. 251

Argentina, Australia, Chile, Mexico, the EU, New Zealand, and Switzerland also raised either intellectual property or
trade barrier challenges to the proposed regulations. 252 In his analysis of alcohol manufacturers' participation in trade
and investment treaties, Dr. Donald Zeigler observes parallels between the tobacco companies' intellectual property
claims and those that alcohol manufacturers advocate in trade and investment instruments. 253
IV. INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC HEALTH LAW IN A WORLD OF STRONG INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
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It is certainly true that international intellectual property protections do not completely preclude international public
health law's potential gains. For example, IP protections pose no obvious barriers to preventing the distribution of
free infant formula samples to health care workers, nor to the adoption of prohibitions on smoking in public places.
Moreover, there are inchoate efforts in discrete areas of international public health law that are generally unrelated to IP
rights, like the international recruitment of health workers. 254 Yet, broadly speaking, the potential gains from existing
international public health law instruments and those on the horizon are fundamentally tied to the subordination of the
wide powers intellectual property holders now hold. In spite of the episodes described above, the central significance of
international intellectual property protection to the development of international public health law appears curiously
askew of global health advocates' primary agenda.
Article 15 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, for example, calls for the elimination of all forms of illicit
trade in tobacco products, of which counterfeit cigarettes are an integral part. When the parties negotiated a separate
treaty to give effect to that provision, the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, they agreed in Article
2 that “[n]othing in this Protocol shall affect the rights and obligations of any Party pursuant to any other international
convention, treaty or international *765 agreement in force for that Party that it deems to be more conducive to
the achievement of the elimination of illicit trade in tobacco products.” 255 In short, any agreement that gives strong
protection to tobacco trademarks, which are always asserted as a defense against the counterfeit cigarette trade, is fully
compatible with the Protocol. 256
Similarly, at the same time the WHO is attempting to conclude a Medical Research and Innovation Treaty, it is also
undertaking greater efforts toward fostering collaboration on counterfeit medicines and devices, i.e., unsafe, unregulated,
or fraudulently labeled or represented drugs which pose risks of illness, injury or death to patients. There are of course
numerous ways to define “counterfeit” drugs, including a definition that emphasizes the infringement of protected
trademarks under TRIPS, 257 but also one that focuses on the effects of counterfeits on patients, in which IP rights
are less implicated. 258 Notwithstanding key policy flexibilities attached to definitional choices, the World Health
Assembly has decided to study the public health effects of counterfeit medicines “excluding trade and intellectual
property considerations,” a determination which will inevitably influence the outcome of any international agreement
on the issue. 259
Those calling for a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control have argued rather loosely that it should be another
version of the FCTC, and have advanced few if any provisions which might address the IP challenges the FCTC has faced.
The WHO's Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol acknowledges the role of marketing in influencing
consumption but does not address the role of trademark law in obstructing recommended measures. The Framework
Convention on Global Health has gone even further, suggesting that “an FCGH could require states and international
organizations to show that loan conditions or trade rules are *766 not detrimental to the public's health.” 260 But the
FCGH still avoids the detailed international IP protections that would jeopardize its mission. 261
A. Rescission of Existing Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral Intellectual Property Agreements
Whatever the promise of health diplomacy, it does not appear that “health” is overcoming the traditional concerns
of “diplomacy.” Implausible proposals call for the elimination of international IP agreements altogether to solve this
problem. Some, like Kojo Yelpalla, would simply throw entire agreements like TRIPS out:
Before TRIPS, over forty countries offered no patent protection for pharmaceutical inventions. Such
sovereign authority of states has been compromised by TRIPS as part of the WTO system of agreements. . . .
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This exploitation of the inequalities of bargaining power was undertaken at a time when many developing
countries were ill equipped or unprepared to appreciate all the implications of TRIPS. Nor did they fully
understand the significance of the converging forces at work. In riding the tidal wave of these forces, the
developed countries did not merely succeed in linking the right to trade to the protection of intellectual
property rights; they also succeeded in setting up a structure whereby, under international law, foreign
private interests could subvert the political authority and public interest of the state. . . . It is now widely
acknowledged by most observers that TRIPS is a serious threat to human health security. 262

Even scholars less hostile to the underlying purpose of the agreement concede that the built-in flexibilities of TRIPS 263
may not help much against determined IP-rights holders with the heaviest investments in knowledge-intensive processes
or assets. 264 Yet it is certainly true that in response to developments in international investment and trade law, some
states are revising or withdrawing from agreements with strong intellectual property protections. 265
*767 B. Revision of Existing Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral Intellectual Property Agreements
Other, more pragmatic, solutions require working within existing international IP agreement frameworks. Bilateral,
regional and international IP treaties, for example, do not need to afford IP holders an entire administrative and
judicial framework that may, and often does, exaggerate the benefits those goods offer. Firms, for example, have shown
themselves able to punish governments who threaten their intellectual property investments. 266 Other solutions involve
explicit limitations on the adjudicatory rights private parties enjoy under bilateral or multilateral instruments. 267 This
is, in effect, the aim of the Doha Declaration, which emphasizes the rights of governments to facilitate access to medicines
for their citizens, as well as more modern trends in bilateral investment treaties. 268 The United States, for example,
has determined that investment agreements should not provide foreign investors with greater substantive protections
than domestic investors. 269 Australia has recently moved away from investor-state dispute resolutions in its investment
agreements. 270 Other possibilities include concrete exceptions for public health measures and the exemption of IP and
related rights from bilateral agreements.
Another strategy is to explicitly address international intellectual property rights in international public health
agreements themselves. WHO Article 19 treaties, like the FCTC and its Illicit Trade Protocol, Article 21 measures like
the IHR, and even Article 23 recommendations like the International Code frankly depend on the curtailment or at
least contextualization of IP rights to succeed. Ignoring or downplaying the importance of IP rights leaves large gaps
in the potential coverage offered by international public health law. To phrase it another way, international public
health law to a significant extent is intellectual property law. To be *768 sure, IP issues often permeate negotiations
over international public health law instruments. Negotiators successfully included “trademark” as a subject of FCTC
Article 11's prohibition on misleading descriptors over the objection of states with strong trademark-rights holding
constituencies. 271 But the examples described above, including the Illicit Trade Protocol, the Framework Convention on
Alcohol Control and the Framework Convention on Global Health demonstrate the general reluctance of public health
stakeholders to specifically address management of IP rights as part of broader international public health law initiatives.
This is unsustainable even for public-private partnerships, which generally operate well within the boundaries of
international intellectual property protection. The Global Fund's activities, for example, may fall afoul of ACTA. 272
The GAVI Alliance's model of Advanced Market Commitment institutionalizes the fundamental difficulty IP rights
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pose: because the AMCs are so expensive and technically detailed, they both limit the amount of vaccines that can be
purchased and threaten to crowd out lower-cost manufacturers. 273
Strategies incorporating IP law into the global public health framework do not necessarily need to sharply limit
or manage IP rights in the text of agreements. However, they must at least address the fundamental threat that
enforceable IP rights in international agreements pose to public health interventions. These threats, of course, vary
in their severity. For patents, for example, there is an identifiable point of protection at which original innovation is
encouraged and therefore welfare-enhancing. Past that point, the patent monopoly threatens accompanying innovations,
which may result in higher-quality products or processes or means by which those products or processes might be
less expensively distributed. For trademarks, especially alcohol, beverage, food and tobacco trademarks, rights-holders
spend vast amounts learning which shapes, colors, figures and other visual cues will enhance consumption. This leads
to consumption well beyond any limit set by evidence-based nutrition policy or even the limited purpose trademarks are
meant to serve: distinguishing competitors' products or services. 274
For example, it makes sense to impose liability upon tobacco manufacturers with respect to the costs deceptive
trademarks impose on society and the heavy investments they make in shaping the perception of their products'
risks. That liability may be imposed without violating trademark-protective *769 terms in TRIPS and many bilateral
investment treaties. This was originally possible under early versions of Article 19 of the FCTC, although the scope of
such liability was eventually narrowed. The same would be true, to varying extents, for alcohol and food manufacturers.
Together, these three industries account for a significant part of the disease burden that international public health law
aims to address.
The Medical Research and Innovation Treaty, to date, represents the approach most likely to harmonize international
intellectual property law and international public health law in ways respectful of both. The treaty creates a regime under
which specific drug and medical device development will occur in a space “where the current [international intellectual
property] system does not function.” The compromises involved will no doubt disappoint both strong IP-rights advocates
and public health advocates, but explicitly balancing the costs and benefits of each in an open forum increases the chance
that an equitable conclusion will be reached. Indeed, the treaty, once considered dead letter, was revived during the 2013
meeting of the World Health Assembly when the United States proposed a series of demonstration projects that might
bridge the current, deep divides between member states over the treaty's terms. 275
C. The Role of Multipolarity in Rebalancing International Intellectual Property Protections and International Public
Health Law
Addressing intellectual property challenges in public health treaties inevitably means protracted negotiations and
perhaps fewer agreements. On the one hand, this might mean advocacy resources are allocated to more effective uses. If
the allocation of scarce resources requires a choice, advocates for better access to medicines may do better influencing the
scope of patentability in statutory regimes than in negotiating a medical research and innovation treaty. 276 On the other
hand, the shifting distribution of global political power also increases the opportunities for compromises that may not
have existed in 2004 (IHR) or 2005 (FCTC) and certainly did not exist in 1981 (International Code). For example, Brazil
and India, which operated largely outside the international trading system in 1981, are now among its most important
participants. 277 Their thriving *770 generics industries have encouraged both states to use international intellectual
property treaties to loosen the strong protections given patents and trademarks in the medicines context.
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Similarly, efforts like the putative Framework Convention on Alcohol Control face long odds given that the world's
largest alcoholic beverage firms have steep roots not only in North America and Europe but also in Australia, Brazil,
Mexico and South Africa. Paula O'Brien has pointed out the inconsistency between Australia's aggressive treatment of
tobacco trademarks and the protests it has launched against Thailand's efforts to use the same public health intervention
for the alcohol disease burden it bears. 278
It is not only individual states and their relative influence that will bear on the potential success of international public
health law in the future. 279 Brazil, India and South Africa also build coalitions and alliances through direct monetary
and non-monetary aid. 280 The growing web of economic and political alliances between these and other developing
states will expand the possibilities for coalition building in support of certain international instruments but against
others. 281
CONCLUSION
Confrontations between expanding intellectual property rights and international public health law are now poised to
increase rather than abate as international agreements addressing both proliferate. 282 If the population health gains
envisioned by the International Code, the IHR and the FCTC, as well as the Framework Convention on Alcohol Control
or the Framework Convention on Global Health are to materialize, their respective advocates must more squarely
address the obstacles international property agreements pose for those gains and develop strategies to overcome them or
concede their political improbability. These strategies include negotiating concrete public health safe harbors in bilateral
investment and trade agreements, modifying dispute resolution mechanisms *771 and conditioning compliance with
national law and norms. 283 Other possibilities include ex post strategies that redistribute monopoly gains intellectual
property rights holders enjoy. For example, Article 19 of the FCTC might authorize compensation for illness or injury
caused by consumption induced by a misleading trademark. 284 The proposed Medical Research and Innovation Treaty,
for example, places at its core redistributive defects inherent in strong intellectual property regimes. Despite opposition
from states with strong patent right holding constituencies, the proposal is, slowly, moving forward. As or more
important, the changing distribution of economic, diplomatic and political power renders a broader range of possibilities
for coalition building and influence, especially where Brazil, India and South Africa are key stakeholders. 285
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Public Private Partnerships, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 55, 60 (2011).
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134

See id.

135

See id. at 19-21.

136

See id. at 24.

137

See generally Justin Hughes, A Short History of “Intellectual Property” in Relation to Copyright, 33 CARDOZO L. REV.
1293 (2012).

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

39

Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only

MULTIPOLARITY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE..., 35 Mich. J. Int'l L. 715

138
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(2004).
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Stella A. Bialous & Derek Yach, Whose Standard Is It, Anyway? How the Tobacco Industry Determines the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) Standards for Tobacco and Tobacco Products, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 96, 103
(2001).
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Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTative (Oct. 11, 2011), http://
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Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP) initiative, the International Trademark Association (INTA),
and the International Security Management Association.”).
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Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Schwab Announces U.S. Will Seek New Trade Agreement
to Fight Fakes (Oct. 23, 2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/ambassador-schwab-announces-us-will-seek-new-tradeagreement-fight-fakes.
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Eight parties have signed ACTA: Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States.
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E.U. signed ACTA on January 26, 2012, but it still needs to be signed and ratified by all 27 Member States because ACTA
contains “criminal enforcement provisions, an area that is considered of ‘shared’ competence between the EU and its Member
States.” What ACTA is About, EUR. COMM'N (May 4, 2012, 5:00 PM), http:// trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/january/
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See ACTA, supra note 163.
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Margot Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 34 YALE J.
INT'L L. 247, 250 (2009).

170

ACTA, supra note 163, art. 6, PP 1, 2 (ACTA further requires these procedures be “fair and equitable ... and ... not be
unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays”).

171

See Eddan Katz & Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement on the Knowledge Ecomnomy:
The Accountability of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative for the Creation of IP Enforcement Norms Through
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ACTA, supra note 163, art. 7, P 1.

173
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175
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See Sean Flynn, ACTA's Constitutional Problem: The Treaty is Not a Treaty, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 903, 905, 911-12
(2012).

178

Cynthia M. Ho, Global Access to Medicine: The Influence of Competing Patent Perspectives, 35 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1, 94-95 (2011).

179

Brook K. Baker, ACTA-Risks of Third-Party Enforcement for Access to Medicines, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 579, 588-89
(2011).
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See Yu, supra note 164, at 1036.
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Id. at 1024 (referring to the “policy laundering” potential of ACTA).

182

Jane Kelsey, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: A Gold-Plated Gift to the Global Tobacco Industry? 39 AM. J.L.
& MED. 237, 264 (2013) (“At the time of writing, it is unclear if a final deal will be concluded.”). See Robert Stumberg,
Safeguards for Tobacco Control: Options for the TPPA, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 382, 388-390 (2013).

183

U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Intellectual Property Provisions in International Investment Arrangements, 5,
UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2007/1 (2007) (“A sizable proportion of these [investment] treaties include provisions obligating
the contracting parties to meet [[intellectual-property] standards that are more stringent than the ones found in the TRIPS
Agreement.”).

184

Sam Foster Halabi, Efficient Contracting Between Foreign Investors and Host States: Evidence from Stabilization Clauses,
31 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 261, 263 (2011) (discussing trends in bilateral investment treaty dyads).
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Graham Mayeda, Playing Fair: The Meaning of Fair and Equitable Treatment in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 J. WORLD
TRADE 273, 273-74 (2007).

186

See, e.g., Agreement Between the Swiss Confederation and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Reciprocal
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Switz.-Uru., art. 5, Oct. 7, 1988, 1976 U.N.T.S. 413 [[hereinafter 1988 SwissUruguayan BIT].

187

See Kojo Yelpaala, Fundamentalism in Public Health and Safety in Bilateral Investment Treaties [Part I], 3 ASIAN J. WTO
& INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 235, 236, 239 (2008).
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UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999, at 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000).
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José E. Alvarez, A Bit on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 17, 17 (2009).
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See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and
Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 307, 311-12 (2008).
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See Julien Chaisse, Exploring the Confines of International Investment and Domestic Health Protections--Is a General
Exceptions Clause a Forced Perspective?, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 332, 341, 353 (2013).
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Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth
and Reality, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1550, 1554-55 (2009). Contra Christophe Dugué, Dispute Resolution in International
Project Finance Transactions, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1064, 1072 (2001) (noting that international financiers often prefer
English or New York courts).

193

1988 Swiss-Uruguayan BIT, supra note 186, arts 1, 5.

194

See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY,
art.1 (2012), available at http:// www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%C20for%C20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.

195

See Lee Petherbridge, Intelligent TRIPS Implementation: A Strategy for Countries on the Cusp of Development, 22 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 1029, 1047-48 (2001) (arguing for the use of interpretative devices).

196

OXFAM INT'L, ALL COSTS, NO BENEFITS: HOW TRIPS-PLUS INTELLECTUAL PROperty Rules in the US-Jordan
FTA Affect Access to Medicines 2 (2007), available at http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/all%20costs,%C20no
% 20benefits.pdf.
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Sam Foster Halabi, International Trademark Protection and Global Public Health: A Just Compensation Regime for
Expropriations and Regulatory Takings, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 321, 344-45 (2012).

198

See id. at 345, n.123.

199

See Daniel Benoliel & Bruno Salama, Towards an Intellectual Property Bargaining Theory: The Post-WTO Era, 32 U. PA.
J. INT'L L. 265, 314-325 (2010); Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working under the WTO TRIPS
Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 393 (2002).

200

Guatemala: An Assessment of Poverty, WORLD BANK POVERTY ANALYSIS (2013), http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,
contentMDK:20207581~menuPK:443285~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~ theSitePK:430367,00.html.

201

Id.

202
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